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Abstract
We examine the effect of household financial indebtedness on the incidence of partnership
dissolution using a large survey of families with children in Britain. We use detailed data on
household finances to provide a robust statistical analysis of the relationship between
indebtedness and partnership dissolution and to avoid the potential simultaneity of financial
and psychological health responses that arise when using self-reported data on the extent of
household ‘financial problems’. We examine whether the data provides any support for the
‘economic’ models of divorce and separation developed by Gary Becker and his colleagues.
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21. Introduction
This paper investigates the effect that financial stress, perhaps induced by adverse changes
to the economic position of the household, has on the probability of partnership dissolution in
Britain. It uses data from a large random sample of couples with children, including
unmarried cohabiting couples, over the period 2001–2008. Despite a growing literature which
examines the effect of changing economic circumstances on family well-being (such as
Wildman, 2003; Ferrie et al, 2003 and Bridges and Disney, 2010), the impact of financial
stress on other aspects of family life, notably the stability of partnerships between couples,
has rarely been empirically investigated, let alone with recent data. In particular, few
empirical studies have looked specifically at the impact of household indebtedness and
periods of financial stress on partnership instability. A likely reason for this omission,
especially in Britain, is the absence of suitable data sets with precise measures of household
indebtedness. Such an analysis seems overdue given the financial position of many families
in Britain. Not only has real household disposable income fallen in recent years (ONS, 2011),
but household indebtedness in the UK remains among the highest in the European Union
(OECD, 2012).1
We address this gap in the empirical literature using data from the Families and Children
Survey (FACS), a rich but under-utilised panel data set. The FACS is a unique data set in
Britain insofar as it contains precise indicators of household financial stress in addition to
general changes in household economic circumstances. The survey asks both qualitative and
quantitative questions on financial hardship in each wave, together with questions on the
extent and nature of credit and borrowing arrangements and measures of ‘over-indebtedness’
1 The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) predicts that household debt will be £2,113bn by the end of 2015.
According to Credit Action (a debt advice charity), this would increase the average household debt (including
mortgages) from £57,635 in 2011 to £83,849 per household in 2015.
3such as the level of arrears on debt.2 These questions are not available in other surveys
examining family behaviour.3
We estimate the hazard of separation (i.e. of divorce/partnership dissolution) using a
discrete-time proportional hazard model, where survival time is the duration of the
partnership.4 We examine whether the underlying stability of the partnership is affected by
household indebtedness, and whether changes (‘shocks’) to the financial position of the
household such as increases or decreases in the level of over-indebtedness, and job gain and
loss, influence the stability of the union.
We find that over-indebtedness, captured by the number of debts (including household
bills) when the household is in arrears, has a positive effect on the likelihood of separation.
However, the analysis also establishes that any changes, whether positive or negative, to the
household’s economic position may affect the probability of partnership dissolution. These
findings persist after controlling for life cycle effects and unobserved heterogeneity. For
example, a reduction in the level of over-indebtedness and an increase in labour market
participation increase the incidence of separation, along with the expected effect of adverse
shocks or ‘stress’ variables such as worsening over-indebtedness. Insofar as these changes are
unanticipated by one or other partner, the results are consistent with Becker et al.’s (1977)
model of partnership dissolution.
One basic problem in establishing causality from over-indebtedness to partnership
dissolution is that shocks to households may simultaneously both increase over-indebtedness
and the likelihood of separation. For example, becoming unemployed may lead to behaviour
2 Although there is no agreed single measure of over-indebtedness, in line with other studies we use whether the
household has arrears on consumer debt and on other household bills as our primary indicator of over-
indebtedness (see Bridges and Disney, 2004, and Kempson et al., 2004).
3 The British Household Panel Survey asks questions about aggregate household debt, ownership of specific
assets and the use of particular credit instruments in Waves 5, 10 and 15.
4 In a companion paper, we use simple descriptive statistics to investigate the relationship between indebtedness
and separation (Bridges and Disney, 2012).
4such as gambling or alcoholism that may lead to both outcomes. We handle this potential
identification issue in a number of ways. We control for the direct effects of measurable
shocks to the household’s finances on indebtedness (e.g. resulting from job loss or some other
shock to income). We do this by utilising changes in household expenditure and in the
household’s self-reported ability to finance its outgoings, both of which might also have an
impact on separation, as measures of these ‘direct effects’. Our results on the relationship
between over-indebtedness and dissolution are robust to controlling for these direct effects.
They are also robust to the inclusion of a series of ‘shock’ variables that might confound the
arrears-separation relationship. Finally, we tackle identification by dealing with the arrears-
separation relationship in a two-equation system by exploiting instrumental variables that
affect arrears but not separation.5
Another potential problem is reverse causality; couples that are experiencing relationship
strain may change their behaviour to prepare for their impending separation, taking on an
increased amount of debt or changing their labour force participation. We therefore examine
the extent to which couples (especially the female partner) exhibit forward-looking behaviour
in anticipation of separation. We find evidence that some households do change their
behaviour prior to separation: in particular, married females may increase their labour supply
prior to separation. Interestingly, however, while this may indicate an underlying intention of
one or both parties to dissolve their relationship, the change in circumstances also appears
linked in part to prior episodes of financial strain. For example, we find that a response to a
sustained period of household over-indebtedness is for the female respondent to enter the
labour market. The ensuing financial independence of the female partner may in turn trigger a
later separation. Hence, the observed change in labour market behaviour appears linked to a
previous or underlying financial problem within the home. Further support for the notion that
5 The question of simultaneity arises in other facets of the Becker model of family evolution – see, for example,
the discussion of endogenous fertility and its relation to income shocks in Lindo (2010).
5what we are observing is indeed causal is that those couples at most risk from dissolution i.e.
those that have reported a degree of relationship strain in the previous 12 months, do not
appear to engage disproportionately in strategic behaviour prior to separation.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief
overview of the literature on partnership instability and the role of household finances. In
Section 3, we describe the data used in the paper, and provide some descriptive statistics.
Section 4 provides our main empirical results while Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Background and Literature Review
The established literature on the gains from marriage and the causes of marital instability
(such as Becker et al., 1977; Weiss and Willis, 1997, Weiss, 1997) builds on Becker’s (1973,
1974) theory of marriage. Becker argues that couples meet through a process of search and
separate when the expected utility from remaining together falls below the expected utility
from divorcing and possibly remarrying. Thus while a union between two individuals may
initially seem optimal from the perspective of both partners, this assessment can subsequently
change as a result of the arrival of new information, which may cause either partner to re-
evaluate the quality of the match.
The key point here is that this information must be unanticipated. Adverse events known
to the couple at the outset or expected to occur should be taken into account in the decision to
form the partnership. The future stability of the union is also affected by the initial quality of
the match. If the gains from the partnership are large, small shocks should not destabilise the
union. The probability of dissolution will thus be lower amongst couples well matched in
terms of similar life experiences and goals. This last proposition has been established
6empirically by, for example, Böheim and Ermisch (2001), Charles and Stephens (2004), and
Weiss and Willis (1997).
Less empirical research has examined how changing economic factors affect partnership
dissolution decisions. In line with Becker’s predictions, those studies that focus on economic
factors tend to focus on unanticipated changes to family income. Becker et al. (1977) use
cross-section data for the United States to show that both unexpectedly high and
unexpectedly low male earnings have a positive effect on divorce. That finding used data for
1966 when divorce rates were relatively low; a more recent study by Starkey (1991) finds a
similar result; large deviations between a husbands’ actual and expected income increases the
probability of divorce. In addition, Weiss and Willis (1997) show that expectations about
earnings capacity formed at the time of the marriage have no effect on subsequent divorce
rates; rather, it is changes in predicted incomes arising from new information that lead to
separation. However, Hoffman and Duncan (1995) find that income and wage changes have
only a small effect on marital dissolution.
How do household finances fit into this framework? The basic ‘building block’ of a
structural model of indebtedness is the life cycle hypothesis of saving and consumption
(expenditure) developed by Franco Modigliani and his collaborators.6 Here, a forward-
looking household uses the capital market to smooth its spending over the life cycle relative
to fluctuations in its income stream and to changes in the household’s composition (e.g. as a
result of births and ageing). As such, there is a strong likelihood that a rational household will
accumulate and decumulate wealth (and debts) over its lifetime (particularly in the form of
collateralised debt – namely mortgages to finance house purchases) by utilising borrowing
and savings to engage in ‘consumption-smoothing’. Therefore, in line with Becker et al.’s
(1977) notion that it is only new information that can destabilise a union, the accumulation of
6 See Ando and Modigliani (1963), Modigliani and Brumberg (1954, 1979).
7debt should not, in itself, be associated with partnership dissolution. Indeed, insofar as
marriage is often seen by a financial provider as a signal of stability, couples may have access
to a greater value of debt than those who are single (conditional on other characteristics such
as age and income).
However, enhanced access to credit may expose the household to a greater risk of over-
indebtedness in the event of an unanticipated adverse shock to the couple’s finances, such as
the loss of one (or both) earners’ incomes or health incapacity. Using borrowing to smooth
spending over adverse short run shocks to household finances is potentially risky (Sullivan,
2008). For example, if a household uses borrowing to maintain spending during a spell of
unemployment at a comparable level to when employed, there is the obvious danger that a
subsequent adverse macroeconomic shock or other causes of difficulties in finding a job may
expose that household to borrowing arrears. There is the important counter-balancing factor
that a responsible lender might be cautious in lending to such a household; however, this in
turn may drive the household into a borrowing arrangement on much less favourable terms
outside the formal credit market. A key assumption of this paper is that, although some
couples may voluntarily use loans or credit card debt to smooth expenditure, nobody would
plan to enter into persistent arrears on debt or into bankruptcy given the long-term negative
effect that default and persistent arrears can have on an individual’s credit score and his or
her ability to borrow money in the future.7
A second relevant issue concerns how persistent debt interacts with family formation. The
accumulation of arrears on debt, and repeated episodes of over-indebtedness are often
associated with persistently low household incomes and a lack of earnings capacity. Hence,
the association between partnership instability and financial stress brought about by periods
of indebtedness is more likely to occur in partnerships that are characterised by relative
7 We abstract from any strategic features of the bankruptcy decision; household strategic bankruptcy seems to be
less common in the UK than in the United States and has been little analysed by economists in the UK.
8youthfulness, low-paying jobs, periods of unemployment, and other measures of financial
hardship, especially if these episodes of financial stress persist for long periods.
Although empirical studies report an association between financial strain and conflict and
stress among couples which increases the likelihood of a relationship failing (Sullivan,
Warren and Westbrook, 2000) few studies have looked at the impact household indebtedness
has on partnership dissolution, let alone with recent data. This reflects the paucity of suitable
data sets with precise measures of financial indebtedness and arrears, especially in Britain.
Instead, the available evidence tends to concentrate on financial strain brought about by job
loss and the resultant loss of income. Attewell (1999) and Charles and Stephens (2004) argue
that job displacement raises the risk of marital breakdown, while Duncan and Hoffman
(1985) find that pre-divorce income levels are lower in households that are about to divorce
than those that do not. On a related issue, Böheim and Ermisch (2001) show that those
couples who experience an unexpected improvement in their financial situation are less likely
to dissolve their partnership, while Fisher and Lyons (2006) focus on the relationship
between bankruptcy and divorce.8 We address this gap in the literature, looking specifically
at the role that household indebtedness and arrears plays in partnership dissolution using data
from the Families and Children Survey.
Finally, we also study the extent to which changes to the way the household organises its
finances precedes partnership dissolution. Although, Becker et al. (1977) argue that marital
instability is triggered by unanticipated changes in circumstances, some changes are clearly
endogenous, and changing economic circumstances may indicate the intention of one or both
8 There is also a literature that focuses on the financial consequences of divorce, which are often harsh and
persistent, especially if the divorcee does not remarry. Fisher and Lyons (2006) focuses on financial insolvency
following divorce, while Jenkins (2008) examines the effect marital dissolution has on income following
divorce.
9partners to dissolve the relationship.9 For instance, women who forecast partnerships that are
more fragile may choose to invest more in their careers. Although this is a relatively
unexplored area of research, Johnson and Skinner (1986) using panel data for the United
States find that women who subsequently divorce increase their labour supply in the three
years prior to separation. They argue that this increased labour force participation arises
because the female respondent anticipates the future dissolution of the union and therefore
seeks to improve her position in the labour market so that she can support herself financially
after the divorce. On a related issue, the introduction of no-fault unilateral divorce laws in the
United States led to an increase in the labour supply of married women (see, Parkman, 1992;
Stevenson, 2008; and Genadek et al., 2007).10
3. Data and Descriptive Analysis
3.1. The Families and Children Survey
We use data from a large random sample of couples with children drawn from Britain’s
Families and Children Survey (FACS) over the period 2001-2008.11 The FACS was first
established in 1999 as a survey of low income families. The original sampling frame
comprised all sampled lone parents with children, and couples with children where the
household worked less than 16 hours a week, and/or received Family Credit12, or whose
income was no more than 35 percent above the point at which they would have been entitled
9 In passing, this last finding shows the difficulty of looking at the impact of separation or divorce on the
financial position of ex-partners when either partner had already taken steps to change their economic position
prior to the dissolution of the partnership. However, this issue is of greater relevance to studies of the economic
effects of partnership dissolution, which is not the topic in this paper.
10 No-fault unilateral divorce laws allow either spouse to obtain a divorce without the consent of his or her
partner, thereby reducing the cost of divorce.
11 Due to funding cuts, the last wave of this survey was in 2008, which is unfortunate since the Great Recession
would have created a perfect natural experiment.
12 Between 1988 and October 1999, Family Credit was the main in-work benefit in Britain. It was paid to
women and was designed to encourage low-income families with children to remain in work. In order to be
eligible for Family Credit, a family with children needed to have at least one adult working more than 16 hours a
week. In October 1999, Family Credit was replaced by the Working Families’ Tax Credit, which was replaced
by a combination of the Working Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit in April 2003. Family Credit and its
successors are similar to the Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States.
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to Family Credit.13 The same sample of families was then re-interviewed in 2000. In 2001 the
sample was increased to encompass a representative sample of all families with children, and
has continued thereafter in this format. In what follows we make use of the sample from 2001
onwards when the survey became representative of all families with children.
The FACS asks standard questions on household demographics, health, education, labour
market activities (including job search) and income sources, including questions on eligibility
for tax credits and other welfare benefits. Uniquely for the UK, however, the survey collects
information on financial hardship in each wave together with details of the nature of credit
and borrowing arrangements, and the extent of individual arrears (on these credit instruments
and on specific household bills). The FACS also collects information on the type and level of
savings and investments, although it only collects information on the value of any loans
outstanding from 2003 onwards.
Finally, respondents who live in couples are asked a series of questions about how they
manage and organise their household’s finances using a typology developed by Pahl (1989)
that is now widely used in the literature. Responses range from the household having
independent finances to systems of money management where either the female/male partner
manages the entire household’s money.14
At each yearly interview, respondents are also asked to update their relationship status.
Those in a relationship are asked when they first met, when they began to share a home
together, and whether they are married to their current partner. Individuals whose present
relationship began after the conception of their eldest child are invited to provide details of
13 The financial status of households in the first wave is analysed in Bridges and Disney (2004).
14 Pahl (1989)’s system of money management comprises: (1) the female whole-wage system where the wife
manages the household’s money (except the husband's personal spending money); (2) the male whole-wage
system where the husband manages all the household’s finances; (3) the housekeeping allowance system where
the husband manages most of the money (except for the wife's housekeeping allowance); (4) the pooling system
where household money is pooled and managed jointly; and (5) the independent management system where both
partners have a separate source of income.
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any relationships that took place from the year before their eldest child was born, which can
be used to provide information about behaviour prior to the respondent’s current relationship.
This includes whether they were married before, the length of any previous relationships, and
whether they have any children from a past relationship.
Although a large proportion of families still comprise of ‘traditional’ married couples with
children, individuals are increasingly experiencing family life within a cohabiting couple
(ONS, 2007). We therefore include both married and cohabiting partnerships in our sample of
couples.15 In addition, and in contrast to many other household surveys, in the FACS the
respondent for the most part is the female partner within a couple (i.e. the respondent is
normally a woman).16
Single parents and couples with children are the groups within the population that are
particularly at risk from financial difficulties given housing and child-related expenditures.
Therefore, although the FACS is not representative of the whole population, it nevertheless
constitutes a large random sample of households who are disproportionately at risk of
financial hardship. We do not attempt to assess the ‘representativeness’ of this sample
relative to the population as a whole. We will not capture, for example, the increasing
phenomenon of divorce occurring when children leave home and/or one or other of the
partners retires from full-time work. On the other hand, unlike some psychological studies,
our data set avoids the natural issue of inference arising using selective samples based on
those exhibiting evidence of financial stress.
15 Between 1996 and 2006 there was a 60 percent increase in the number of cohabiting couple families (ONS,
2007). Official statistics suggest that divorce rates rose in the early 1990s and the early 2000s and declined in
each decade thereafter. There has been a trend over the whole period towards later marriages. Civil partnerships
have been enacted in England and Wales since 2005; dissolution rates are high but still make up a small
proportion of overall separations.
16 The respondent’s partner is also interviewed separately in certain sections of the survey, and where this is not
possible proxy questions are asked of the main respondent. However, this information is not always complete.
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The precise data set constructed for the empirical analysis is as follows. We utilise annual
observations on married and cohabiting female respondents who are at risk of their union
dissolving in the following year, thereby identifying the financial characteristics of
relationships that subsequently dissolve and not the effects of dissolution as such. We follow
each individual until she leaves the sample or the survey ends since it is possible for the same
individual to have more than one relationship, and thus be at risk of partnership dissolution
more than once. Overall, this gives us a pooled set of 34,503 data points, being composed of
yearly observations of couples.
3.2. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 describes the key economic and financial characteristics of the pooled sample.
Mean responses (standard deviations) are reported for the entire sample, and then separately
by relationship status. The pooled sample of married/cohabiting respondents is split into four
groups: (1) married throughout the sample period; (2) cohabiting throughout the sample
period; (3) married but separated in t+1; and (4) cohabiting but separated in t+1. Summary
statistics of the remaining variables used in this analysis by relationship status are presented
in Table 1A in the Appendix.
<<Table 1 here>>
Table 1 shows that large differences exist in economic and financial status between those
households that subsequently separate and those that stay together. On average, separating
couples are less likely to be in employment, reflected in lower weekly earnings compared to
their cohabiting/married counterparts. This is particularly true for cohabiting men, 73 percent
of whom are in employment on separation compared to around 90 percent for those that do
not separate. Separating couples are also less likely to be a homeowner (either outright or
with a mortgage), have fewer savings, and are less likely to share the management and
organisation of their finances than non-separating couples.
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Given this lack of earnings capacity and capital as collateral, separating couples prior to
the dissolution of their partnership appeared on average to be less likely to access formal
credit arrangements and instead made greater use of informal loan arrangements. They are
more likely to have experienced repayment problems having accumulated arrears on their
debts. For those with positive arrears, the average number of arrears per household is around
2.3 for those that subsequently dissolve their partnership, compared with around 2 for those
that stay together – this includes not just arrears on credit and debt arrangements but also on
utility bills, council tax bills, mortgages and rent.
These summary statistics establish a positive relationship between episodes of financial
hardship, household over-indebtedness and partnership instability. We now examine more
formally the extent to which the underlying economic position of the household is
responsible for partnership dissolution or whether it is changes to that position that lead to
dissolution.
4. Empirical Strategy and Results
4.1. Empirical Strategy: Discrete-time Proportional Hazard
We begin by estimating the determinants of partnership dissolution using a discrete-time
proportional hazard, ℎ௜௧, where survival time is partnership duration.17 This approach models
the baseline hazard flexibly and avoids any restrictive parametric assumptions about its
shape.18 Suppose iT is a random variable representing time in a relationship, then the
continuous time hazard, )(ti for individual i at time t representing the instantaneous rate at
which individual i separates is a proportional hazard model of the form:
17 This is the model proposed by Prentice and Gloecker (1978), and outlined in Jenkins (1995, 1997).
18 Imposing a parametric specification on the shape of the hazard can bias the estimated effects of the time
varying economic variables and the baseline hazard (Narendranathan and Stewart, 1993).
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where )(0 t is the baseline hazard, and ( )ix t is a vector of time-varying observable
characteristics thought to affect partnership stability with coefficients  . The probability that
individual i separates from her partner at time t+1, conditional on the spell being
uncompleted at time t (i.e. the discrete-time proportional hazard, ℎ௜௧) can then be written as a
function of the continuous time hazards:
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Combining (1) and (2) gives:
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

1
0 )(ln)(
t
t
duut  captures the degree of duration dependence in the hazard of
separation.
We model duration dependence non-parametrically using as a series of time dummies,
which take the value one in each year if the couple has been in a relationship that has lasted at
least t years.19 Since some of the partnerships are likely to have been formed prior to the
respondent entering the survey, we use the relationship history data in the sample to calculate
the duration of the partnership.
In addition, since some respondents are only interviewed after they become at risk of
separation their entry is said to be delayed, and hence the contribution to the likelihood
function of these unions must therefore be conditioned on surviving in the union until
entering the survey. Jenkins (1995) shows that the resulting log-likelihood function is similar
19 The resulting transformation is known as the complementary log-log transformation.
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to the expression without delayed entry, other than that the summations are from the year
when the relationship began to the year when last observed.20
The model discussed so far assumes homogeneity of the survival distribution across
individuals. However, if there are systematic individual differences in the distribution after
controlling for observables, problems of interpretation can arise (see Lancaster, 1979). Hence
we control for heterogeneity by conditioning the model on an individual’s unobserved
characteristics,ݒ௜. Now the continuous time hazard becomes:
))'(exp()(),( 0  txtvtx iiii  (4)
and the corresponding discrete-time hazard function is:
)]log()())'(exp(exp[1 iiit vttxh   (5)
where ݒ௜i is a normally distributed random variable with mean zero.
Finally, in specifying our hazard function we also allow for repeated events. As already
mentioned, it is possible for the same individual to have more than one relationship, and thus
be at risk of partnership dissolution more than once.21 As a result, all specifications have
robust standard errors clustered on the individual to account for any correlation across
spells.22
20 In other words, with delayed entry at time ݑ௜ for individual i, we have to condition on survival up to time ݑ௜
(Jenkins, 1995):
ܮ௜= ( ௛೔ೕଵି௛೔ೕ)௖೔∏ (1 − ℎ௜௞)௝௞ୀଵ ௜ܵ(ݑ௜)ൗ . But ௜ܵ(ݑ௜) = ∏ (1 − ℎ௜௞)௨೔௞ୀଵ where ௜ܿ= 1 if a spell is completed and
௜ܿ= 0 if a spell is right-censored. Now the log-likelihood function becomes:logܮ௜= ∑ [ݕ௜௞logℎ௜௞ + (1 − ݕ௜௞) log(1 − ℎ௜௞)]௝௞ୀ௨೔ାଵ .
This is similar to the expression if there was no delayed entry (Jenkins, 1995).
21 Around 4 percent of couples have more than one relationship during the sample period.
22 Estimation is performed using the STATA program xtcloclog with the data organised in person-year form
(see, Jenkins, 1995, 1997).
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4.2. Household Finances and Partnership Dissolution: Baseline Specification
Maximum likelihood estimates for the hazard of separation, controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity, are in Table 2. Results are presented separately for cohabiting and married
couples. For each regression, the table provides details of the hazard ratio, which measures
the proportional effect on the underlying (instantaneous) hazard of separation of a one-unit
change in a variable. Explanatory variables include controls for characteristics at the start of
the relationship, the quality of the match, household demographics, and a rich set of variables
designed to capture the economic and financial position of the household.
<<Table 2 here>>
We begin with a brief discussion of how relationship and household demographic
variables affect partnership stability, before turning our attention to the key point of the
paper: the role of debt instruments, and episodes of financial stress. Clear differences emerge
between our cohabiting and married couples when we look at the effect that relationship and
household demographic variables have on partnership dissolution.
For both types of couples, the older the age of the respondent at the start of the
relationship, the lower is the likelihood that the partnership will fail. Differences in age
between the respondent and her partner are also important for married couples; married
couples where the respondent is older (normally, here, the female respondent) are more likely
to separate. Such findings are in line with both the theoretical literature and previous
empirical findings: see inter alia Böheim and Ermisch (2001) and Charles and Stephens
(2004). For married couples, family formation is also important. The presence of a young
child (under the age of 4) helps to stabilize a marriage but, overall, a higher number of
children increase the probability of dissolution. Other empirical findings on this are
contradictory and may reflect national traits: Böheim and Ermisch (2001) using British data
find a similar result, but empirical studies for the United States find that the number of
17
children has a negative effect on dissolution (as in Weiss and Willis, 1997 and Charles and
Stephen, 2004).
The key finding for cohabiting couples is the length of the relationship as captured by the
indicators of duration dependence. We observe a monotonic decrease in the hazard of
separation among cohabiting couples as their relationship length increases. This confirms the
existing literature: see inter alia Hoffman and Duncan, 1995; Charles and Stephens, 2004.
Relationships of longer duration are likely to possess more share capital, making them less
likely to fail. The couple’s system of money management is also important, and our results
show that couples (both cohabiting and married) that have shared finances are less likely to
separate.
In the context of the present paper, of particular interest is the effect the economic and
financial position of the household has on the likelihood of separation. Households where the
male partner is in employment are less likely to separate, whilst for those who are married,
female employment has a positive effect on the hazard of separation, raising the hazard of
separation by 42 percent. Household assets and debts are also important. For both types of
couples, home-ownership (either outright or with a mortgage) lowers the incidence of
separation while for married couples the number of savings accounts lowers the hazard of
separation by 15 percent. Such a finding is in line with expectations. As the nature of a
couple’s commitment becomes more explicit in marriage, resources are often pooled (Singh
and Lindsay, 1996). Hence, home-ownership, which often leads to the pooling of resources,
may be viewed as a sign of commitment.
As already mentioned, in line with Becker et al.’s (1977) notion that it is only new
information that can destabilise a union, the accumulation of debt should not in itself be
associated with partnership dissolution. However, high levels of borrowing may expose the
household to a greater risk of over-indebtedness in the event of an unanticipated income
18
shock (Disney et al., 2008), leading to tensions within the home that may pose a risk to the
mental-wellbeing of its members (Bridges and Disney, 2010), and the stability of the
partnership (Eurofound, 2013).
We find that, although the number of formal loans (e.g. from a Bank, Building Society,
finance company or similar institution) has no significant effect on partnership dissolution,
over-indebtedness, captured by the number of debts (including household bills) where the
household is in arrears, has a positive effect on the likelihood of separation. In this instance, a
one-unit increase in the number of debts in arrears raises the hazard of separation by 26
percent for married couples, and 8 percent for cohabiting couples, respectively.
We now subject our empirical analysis to a number of robustness checks by considering
alternative specifications of the baseline specification, and the timing of events. We also
address potential concerns in establishing causality from financial strain to separation.
5. Sensitivity Analysis
5.1. Alternative Measures of Arrears and Definitions of Financial Strain
Next, we investigate whether the observed positive effect of over-indebtedness on
partnership instability is robust to alternative measures of arrears and the inclusion of
different measures of financial strain (Table 3). First, we control for the value of arrears, as a
series of dummy variables, instead of the number of debts in arrears (panel 1) and find that,
for cohabiting couples, arrears of £1000 or less have a positive effect on separation, while for
married couples the oppose is true, and it is arrears greater than £1000 that trigger
dissolution.
<<Table 3 here>>
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Second, in describing the acquisition of debt, economists often think of a ‘hierarchy’ of
debt arrangements, ordered by ease of access or by the costs of borrowing, such as the current
and prospective interest rate. The ‘rational’ borrower would therefore choose the debt
portfolio that minimises the expected cost of financing the target level of debt. As such,
although debt should not in itself lead to separation, the same may not be true of borrowing
from informal sources such as a money lender or ‘tally man’, friend or relative, or having a
loan or advance on wages from an employer. Borrowing from informal sources may be the
type of borrowing that households resort to because they are denied access to formal credit
arrangements. In panel 2 of Table 3, we add loans from informal sources to the baseline
specification, and find that taking out a loan from an informal source has a positive effect on
separation. This provides further evidence that separation is triggered by financial strain.
Next, since FACS only collects information on the value of loans from 2003 onwards, in
the baseline specification we control for the number rather than the value of loans. In panel 3,
we show that our results are robust to controlling for the ratio of debt to earnings, rather than
the number of loans outstanding, and find that for married couples, this ratio of debt to
earnings (another indicator of financial strain) has a positive effect on separation.
Finally, we look at the effect the timing of events has on partnership dissolution. In panel
4, we add arrears lagged one and two years in the past to the baseline specification, and find
that it is current rather than lagged arrears that trigger separation. This provides support for
the notion that it is only ‘surprise’ events that have an (immediate) impact on partnership
dissolution; couples having already dealt with the effect of past shocks. On a related issue,
Charles and Stephens (2004) find that job loss has the biggest impact on dissolution
immediately following the shock. We also examine whether persistent over-indebtedness in
the past, namely being in arrears on debt in t-1 and t-2 has an impact on separation (panel 5).
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Again, we find that separation is triggered by current rather than lagged arrears. Existing
theory is consistent with these results insofar as these financial difficulties are unanticipated.
5.2. Endogeneity (I): Omitted Variables
So far, the analysis has shown that there is an association between arrears and dissolution.
A basic problem in establishing causality from arrears to partnership dissolution is that any
observed change in behaviour prior to separation may also be a response to an unanticipated
change or ‘shock’ elsewhere to the household. It is, for example, possible to think of
numerous potential ‘shocks’ to the household that may simultaneously increase both arrears
and the likelihood of separation. For example, a job loss by one or both partners may lead to
the accumulation of debt as households utilise borrowing to maintain spending at existing
levels, or it may lead to episodes of over-indebtedness as households find it difficult to
service existing debts. As such the baseline specification outlined in Table 3 may also be
capturing the effect variables not central to our proposed arrears-separation relationship have
on dissolution.23
Given the rich nature of the FACS we handle this potential identification issue by adding
controls for these missing ‘shock’ variables to the baseline specification (Table 4a).
Conditional on measuring these changes we examine whether there is any residual effect of
arrears on dissolution. If arrears continue to have an impact on separation, then we argue that
we have an independent effect of arrears on separation. Column 1 controls for changes in
household income. Column 2 includes changes in family circumstances, which one might
expect to yield falling income, including job loss, worsening health, and changes in family
composition. We find that our results are robust to the inclusion of these missing ‘shock’
variables. Of the shock variables, deteriorations in health have a positive effect, whilst the
23 Although it should be noted that in Table 3 (and in all other specifications) we control for unobserved
heterogeneity.
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birth of a child lowers the risk of dissolution. The loss of a job by either partner is
insignificant.24
<<Table 4a here>
Alternatively, we could address this potential identification issue by controlling directly
for the effects shocks to the household (whatever their cause) have on indebtedness. For
example, an increase in the level of household debt usually arises as a result of a decrease in
the ability to pay (e.g. as a result of a job loss or some other negative income shock), or an
increase in consumption, both of which may have a direct effect on relationship stability. In
Table 4b, we utilise changes in household expenditure and in the household’s self-report
ability to finance its outgoings, to capture these direct effects.25
<<Table 4b here>
As before we argue that if arrears continue to have an impact on dissolution, after
controlling for these additional variables, we have an independent effect of arrears on
dissolution. Once again, we find that our results are robust to the inclusion of these missing
variables.
5.3. Endogeneity (II): Instrumental Variables
Our second approach to tackling identification deals directly with the arrears/separation
relationship in a two-equation system by exploiting instrumental variables that affect arrears
but not separation. Although instrumental variables are used extensively in the social sciences
and economics to tackle endogeneity, the use of instrumental variables in duration models is
24 Of course, any repayment problems might be the consequence of a past shock, and we therefore also examine
the extent to which the results are robust to the inclusion of lagged changes in household circumstances. We find
that our results are robust to the inclusion of lagged shock variables. These results are not reported here but are
available upon request.
25 We are able to model explicitly changes to the household’s financial situation over the past 12 months and the
impact this may have on consumption and ability to pay. FACs asks respondents whether their financial
situation has got better/worse over the past 12 months. For those whose situation has changed they are asked the
reason for this change, which includes changes to consumption (having to buy more/fewer things), and ability to
pay (having to manage on less/more money), and we use the responses to these question to control for the direct
effects shocks to the household may have dissolution.
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relatively less developed. We use this as an opportunity to test how robust our results are to
controlling for endogeneity using a two-stage probit regression (Newey, 1987).
We estimate the probability of separation ( ௜݀௧ = 1) using a latent variable model of the
form:
௜݀௧
∗ = ߜܣ௜௧+ ݔ′ଵ௜௧ߚଵ + ݑଵ௜௧ (6a)
ܣ௜௧ = ݔ′ଵ௜௧ߨଵ + ݔ′ଶ௜௧ߨଶ + ݑଶ௜௧ (6b)
where ௜݀௧∗ is the latent (unobserved) propensity of separation for individual i at time t,
ܣ௜௧is our measure of over-indebtedness (arrears), ଵܺ௜௧ is a vector of exogenous variables, ܺଶ௜௧
is a vector of additional instruments, and by assumption the errors are: ݑଵ௜௧,ݑଶ௜௧~ܰ(0, Σ).
In order to find valid instruments for arrears, we draw on the literature on financial
exclusion. One such variable is having a prepayment electricity meter. Notwithstanding the
prevalence of various forms of borrowing and financial debt, the most common form of
arrears is being behind with utility bills, including gas, water and council tax. Electricity bills
are however less prone to arrears, which may be explained by the fact that households at most
risk of financial difficulties have often had a prepayment electricity meter installed (Bridges
and Disney, 2004), making it impossible for them to fall behind on this particular bill. Thus
having a prepayment electricity meter is an indicator that the household may be experiencing
repayment problems on other credit and debt instruments.
As a second set of instruments, we include a selection of dummy variables that indicate
whether our couples are able to afford to take part in certain everyday events (e.g. have a
celebration with presents, for friends and family at special occasions like birthdays), or own
certain basic items (e.g. two pairs of all-weather shoes for each adult). These are events/items
that the population rank as being “necessary, which all adults should be able to afford and
which they should not have to do without” (Gordon et al., 2000: page 1).
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<<Table 5 here>>
Table 5 reports estimates of the probability of separation for cohabiting and married
couples, respectively. Tests for over-identification show that the instruments are valid.26
Although the model structure is rather different from that of the duration models estimated in
the previous sub-sections, similar results emerge and the results once again indicate a positive
relationship between arrears and separation.
To summarize, relationships beset by financial strain are more likely to fail, and this
finding is robust to a number of alternative specifications and the inclusion of different
measures of financial strain. Furthermore, the findings suggest that the direction of causality
is from arrears to dissolution.
6. Symmetry of Shocks and Plans for Dissolution
6.1. Symmetry of Shocks
The analysis so far and in much of the literature focuses on the effect financial strain has
on partnership stability. In Table 6, we examine whether there is any evidence that changes in
economic and financial circumstances are symmetric i.e. whether both positive and negative
changes trigger partnership dissolution, relative to those whose economic and financial
situation remains unchanged. If these changes, whether positive or negative, were
unanticipated by one or other partner at the start of the union, they would be consistent with
Becker’s model of partnership matching and dissolution.
In line with our earlier discussion, we find that the accumulation (and decumulation) of
collateralised debt – namely mortgages to finance house purchases – has little impact on
partnership dissolution. However, for both types of couples, changes to other aspects of the
26 These are tests of the joint null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid instruments, i.e.
uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the estimated equation.
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household’s economic and financial position, both favourable and unfavourable, have a
positive effect on dissolution.
<<Table 6 here>>
We find that an increase in the level of over-indebtedness within the household, measured
by an increase in the number of debts in arrears has a positive effect on dissolution, raising
the hazard of separation by around 90 percent for both types of couples. For cohabiting
couples this variable is symmetric; an improving economic position captured by a reduction
in the number of debts in arrears also has a positive effect on dissolution. Likewise, for
cohabiting couples a decrease in the use of formal loans is positive. For married couples
deterioration in health and the male partner entering employment has a positive effect on
dissolution. In Table 2A in the Appendix, we decompose the route the male partner takes into
employment as being from unemployment, or out of the labour market (e.g. because of
education, sickness or family care). We find that for married couples both routes into
employment have a positive effect on the hazard of separation, which provides support for
the idea that it is the improvement in economic circumstances resulting from finding
employment (rather than any negative effect that may have arisen because of an earlier job
loss) that is behind this positive result.
Of course, a change in economic circumstances may also indicate the intention of one or
both parties to dissolve their partnership; couples that are experiencing relationship strain
may change their behavior to prepare for their impending separation. For example, the
reduction in indebtedness observed prior to dissolution may be in line with credit counselling
advice, which states that individuals should leave a partnership with no joint debts, if
possible, and we return to this issue in the next section.
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6.2. Planning for Dissolution
Next, we investigate whether there is any evidence that couples (especially the female
partner) plan for separation. As mentioned in Section 2, although this is a relatively
unexplored area of research, there is some evidence of forward-looking behaviour by women
prior to separation. For example, Johnson and Skinner (1996) find that women who
subsequently divorce increase their labour supply prior to separation, and argue that rising
divorce rates may account for one-third of the unexplained increase in women’s post war
labour force participation.
We start by examining the effect female job search has on partnership dissolution. The
FACS asks its female respondents a series of questions relating to their job search, including
whether they have been looking for paid work of 16 hours or more a week at any time during
the past 12 months (Table 7). For married females, we find that those who report that they
have been searching for paid work of 16 hours or more and are successful in increasing their
labour supply are more likely to separate (column 1).27
<<Table 7 here>>
Next, we attempt to identify the motivation behind this decision to enter the labour market
and/or work more hours, and the extent to which the decision is linked to the underlying
economic and financial position of the household. Table 7 suggests that the positive
association between increased labour supply and separation appears, at least in part, to be
related to episodes of financial strain in t-1. Interacting successful job search with the level of
over-indebtedness in the household in t-1 has an increasingly positive effect on the incidence
of separation (column 2). Such a finding also holds if we interact successful job search with
the number of outstanding loans (both formal and informal) in t-1 (column 3), and if the male
partner loses his job in t-1 (column 4).
27 This variable is insignificant for cohabiting couples, and Table 7 reports results for married couples only.
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In other words, it is households where the female partner enters the labour market
following an episode of financial strain that are more likely to separate. Table 3A in the
Appendix, which illustrates the results for the fixed effect (conditional) logistic model for the
probability of job search, further supports this point by showing that a married female’s
decision to search for a job appears to be strongly linked to a worsening financial situation in
the home.
Further support for the notion that we are observing a causal relationship between
financial strain and separation can be seen if we look at the behaviour of couples whose
relationships are already under strain, since this is the subset of couples we would expect to
engage in strategic behaviour prior to separation. For both types of couples we find that those
who report that they have lived apart from one another in the past 12 months excluding
breaks for work or study (i.e. couples in ‘strained’ relationships), are more likely to dissolve
their partnership (Table 8).
<<Table 8 here>>
We interact this measure of relationship strain with: (1) successful job search (panel 1); (2)
the level of over-indebtedness (panel 2); and (3) the number of outstanding loans (panel 3).
We find that for this subset of couples, the decision by the female respondent to enter the
labour market and/or work more hours has no significant effect on separation. In addition,
increasing levels of over-indebtedness and the accumulation of loans appear to decrease
rather than increase the incidence of separation. As such, there seems to be no evidence that
these couples engage disproportionately in strategic behaviour prior to separation.28
Combining these findings, the following story emerges. There is some evidence that
households change their behaviour prior to separation; married females increase their labour
28 Similar results hold if we change our variable measuring relationship strain to those who have ever lived apart
from their partner/spouse.
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supply prior to separation. However, although this may indicate an underlying intention of
one or both parties to dissolve the relationship, this change in circumstances also appears to
be linked, at least in part, to an episode of financial strain in the previous year. In addition,
there appears to be no evidence of strategic behaviour among the subset of couples whose
relationships appear to be unstable.
7. Conclusion
Persistent financial problems, especially over-indebtedness, and adverse shocks to the
household such as loss of employment, are widely seen as contributory factors to marital
breakdown and civil partnership dissolution. Studies of these phenomena are limited by a
lack of data; in particular, post-separation psychological studies of contributory stress factors
often rely on data drawn from self-selecting samples. The present study therefore uses a
relatively novel data set for Britain that contains a rich array of measures of financial stress as
well as a careful demarcation of family circumstances to analyse these issues. Using a hazard
specification that controls for unobserved heterogeneity, we show that specific measures of
financial stress – in particular, arrears on household debts – are strong predictors of
separation.
This finding appears to reinforce assertions in the media that periods of economic
instability – notably, in recent times, the growing indebtedness of families in the run-up to the
Great Recession from 2008 and the subsequent downturn in family finances – have been a
factor behind an upward blip in the divorce rate.29 However, in the more general context of
economic models of marriage and separation, our initial finding is tempered in two respects.
29 See, for example BBC News “Divorce rate up ‘because of recession’ report says”, 6 February 2014,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-26070256. However, while the number of divorces rose slightly from 2010 to
2012, the divorce rate (notwithstanding the BBC headline) has been falling for some years.
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First, the established theory of separation predicts that any substantial unanticipated shock of
economic and financial circumstances of the partnership may induce separation – whether a
windfall gain or a substantial loss in earning power. We find some support for this
hypothesis: for example, reductions in indebtedness among cohabiting couples and increased
labour income in married couples are also factors that increase the subsequent likelihood of
separation as, of course, are positive indicators of increasing financial stress.
This raises the possibility, noted elsewhere in the literature, that partners in relationships
who anticipate or intend a subsequent dissolution take prior steps to ensure their financial
independence on dissolution. Hence, we also provide some tentative evidence that changes in
household economic management of this type are predated by periods of financial stress. For
example, more active job search by the female partner is associated with having had a larger
number of outstanding financial loans and arrears in the previous period.
Reforms to divorce law are under active consideration in England and Wales, such as
making the divorce process easier (and less expensive). Some reformers are advocating ‘no
blame’ divorce, but at the same time are concerned about the effects of divorce on children
and other family members. To the extent that divorce is driven by short run economic stress,
such as over-indebtedness, the potential costs of divorce – both pecuniary and social – may
be considerable, compared to settings in which divorce is planned and a result of a longer
term breakdown in the relationship. Our results provide evidence that economic stress to the
household is a factor in the separation of partnerships, but also that partners have often begun
to prepare for dissolution in advance – for example, by the manner in which family finances
are organised and in the changing employment status on both partners. Our results should
contribute to the ongoing discussion on the costs and benefits of divorce reform.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable
Cohabit Separate –
Cohabit
Married Separate -
Married
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Employment status:
Respondent employed 0.68 0.47 0.51 0.5 0.75 0.43 0.71 0.45
Partner employed 0.87 0.34 0.73 0.45 0.93 0.26 0.86 0.35
Household finances:
Total weekly family earnings (£) 333.24 305.01 226.05 231.22 412.67 331.86 358.84 306.95
Owner (=1 if owned outright) 0.04 0.2 0.03 0.17 0.1 0.3 0.04 0.2
Mortgage (=1 if has mortgage against
property)
0.6 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.76 0.42 0.66 0.47
Number of saving accounts 1.21 1.36 0.76 1.04 1.85 1.57 1.3 1.38
Value of savings (£) 5470.84 21898.57 3521.15 35856.45 10862.52 33461.93 5314.87 15045.42
We share and manage our finances jointly 0.5 0.5 0.38 0.49 0.52 0.5 0.46 0.5
Formal credit arrangement (=1 if has at
least 1 credit card, charge card or store
card, 0 otherwise) 0.54 0.5 0.41 0.49 0.74 0.44 0.64 0.48
Formal loan (=1 if has at least 1 loan from
a from a Bank, Building Society, finance
company or similar institution, 0 otherwise) 0.19 0.39 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.39 0.25 0.43
Informal loan (=1 if have at least 1 loan
from a money lender or ‘tally man’, friend
or relative, a loan, or advance on wages,
from an employer, 0 otherwise) 0.12 0.32 0.21 0.41 0.06 0.23 0.13 0.33
Proportion of households who are in arrears
with at least 1 debt 0.18 0.39 0.37 0.48 0.06 0.24 0.17 0.37
Number of debts in arrears (if arrears>0) 2.01 1.44 2.26 1.49 1.91 1.33 2.21 1.62
Value of outstanding arrears (£) 109.84 493.2 215.07 710.1 38.15 321.96 137.35 679.12
Number of observations (person-year) 8,057 1,066 24,303 1,077
Notes: Weekly earnings, savings and arrears are in 2008 prices. For both types of couples, the mean response for those couples who
separate is statistically different from those who stay together at the 5 percent level.
35
Table 2: Baseline Specification: Discrete-time Proportional Hazard Estimates of the
Hazard of Separation
Cohabiting Married
Variable Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio
Partnership characteristics:
Respondent's age at the start of the relationship -0.026*** 0.975*** -0.038*** 0.963***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013)
Partners have same level of education -0.044 0.957 -0.108 0.897
(0.100) (0.096) (0.112) (0.101)
Respondent 5+ years older than partner 0.0002 1.000 0.436 1.547
(0.228) (0.228) (0.289) (0.447)
Respondent between 2 and 5 years older than partner 0.250 1.284 0.555*** 1.741***
(0.180) (0.231) (0.213) (0.372)
Partner 5+ years older than respondent -0.023 0.977 0.060 1.062
(0.114) (0.111) (0.138) (0.147)
Child from a previous relationship -0.122 0.885 -0.388** 0.679**
(0.136) (0.120) (0.155) (0.105)
Previously married -0.081 0.922 0.220 1.246
(0.244) (0.225) (0.253) (0.315)
Household characteristics:
Number of dependent children -0.051 0.950 0.197*** 1.218***
(0.055) (0.053) (0.058) (0.071)
=1 if at least 1 child under the age of 4 years in the household -0.001 0.999 -0.378** 0.685**
(0.130) (0.130) (0.151) (0.103)
Higher degree/Degree - respondent -0.287 0.750 -0.174 0.840
(0.211) (0.158) (0.162) (0.136)
Higher degree/Degree - partner -0.347 0.707 -0.129 0.879
(0.218) (0.154) (0.161) (0.141)
We share and manage our finances jointly -0.393*** 0.675*** -0.318*** 0.728***
(0.097) (0.065) (0.106) (0.077)
Respondent employed -0.069 0.933 0.354*** 1.424***
(0.114) (0.106) (0.134) (0.190)
Partner employed -0.309** 0.735** -0.424** 0.655**
(0.131) (0.096) (0.173) (0.113)
Total weekly family earnings (£'00s) -0.020 0.981 0.019 1.019
(0.026) (0.026) (0.018) (0.018)
Owner (=1 if owned outright) -0.935** 0.393** -0.531** 0.588**
(0.380) (0.149) (0.257) (0.151)
Mortgage (=1 if has mortgage against property) -0.463*** 0.630*** -0.502*** 0.606***
(0.122) (0.077) (0.148) (0.090)
Number of saving accounts -0.076 0.927 -0.159*** 0.853***
(0.052) (0.048) (0.045) (0.038)
Number of formal loans 0.043 1.043 0.043 1.044
(0.113) (0.118) (0.118) (0.124)
Number of debts in arrears 0.074* 1.077* 0.228*** 1.256***
(0.041) (0.044) (0.055) (0.070)
Duration Dependence:
=1 if relationship lasted 2 years, 0 otherwise -0.492*** 0.611*** -0.164 0.849
(0.158) (0.097) (0.395) (0.335)
=1 if relationship lasted 3 years, 0 otherwise -0.253 0.777 -0.364 0.695
(0.159) (0.123) (0.402) (0.280)
=1 if relationship lasted 4 years, 0 otherwise -0.513*** 0.599*** -0.049 0.952
(0.187) (0.112) (0.364) (0.347)
=1 if relationship lasted 5 years, 0 otherwise -0.800*** 0.449*** -0.010 0.990
(0.223) (0.100) (0.363) (0.359)
=1 if relationship lasted between 6 and 10 years, 0 otherwise -0.793*** 0.452*** -0.346 0.708
(0.170) (0.077) (0.316) (0.224)
=1 if relationship lasted between 11 and 15 years, 0 otherwise -1.072*** 0.342*** -0.501 0.606
(0.269) (0.092) (0.335) (0.203)
=1 if relationship lasted more than 15 years, 0 otherwise -1.212*** 0.298*** -1.005*** 0.366***
(0.321) (0.095) (0.355) (0.130)
Constant -0.904*** 0.405*** -2.323*** 0.098***
(0.335) (0.136) (0.600) (0.059)
Number of observations 9,123 25,380
Log-likelihood -1816 -2077
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis: The Effect Alternative Measures of Arrears and Financial
Strain have on Separation
Cohabiting Married
Variable Coefficient
Hazard
Ratio Coefficient
Hazard
Ratio
(1) Value of Arrears
Number of formal loans 0.052 1.054 0.044 1.045
(0.112) (0.118) (0.119) (0.125)
=1 if arrears>£0 and arrears<=£500 0.204* 1.226 0.164 1.178
(0.128) (0.157) (0.205) (0.241)
=1 if arrears>£500 and arrears<=£1000 0.369* 1.447* 0.425 1.529
(0.202) (0.292) (0.336) (0.514)
=1 if arrears>£1000 and arrears<=£2000 0.244 1.276 0.908*** 2.479***
(0.258) (0.330) (0.342) (0.847)
=1 if arrears>£2000 0.136 1.146 0.860** 2.362**
(0.338) (0.388) (0.432) (1.021)
Additional controls Yes Yes
Number of observations 9,123 25,380
Log-likelihood -1810 -2070
(2) Formal + Informal Loans
Number of formal loans 0.049 1.051 0.045 1.046
(0.113) (0.118) (0.119) (0.124)
Number of informal loans 0.103 1.108 0.315** 1.370**
(0.109) (0.120) (0.154) (0.211)
Number of debts in arrears 0.058 1.059 0.176*** 1.192***
(0.039) (0.041) (0.055) (0.066)
Additional controls Yes Yes
Number of observations 9,123 25,380
Log-likelihood -1815 -2075
(3) Value of Loans (Debt to Earnings Ratio)
Ratio of debt/earnings -0.002 0.998 0.001** 1.001**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of debts in arrears 0.095* 1.100* 0.240*** 1.271***
(0.055) (0.060) (0.078) (0.099)
Additional controls Yes Yes
Number of observations 6,556 18,669
Log-likelihood -1184 -1396
(4) Lagged Arrears
Number of formal loans 0.115 1.121 -0.100 0.905
(0.139) (0.156) (0.163) (0.148)
Number of debts in arrears 0.167*** 1.181*** 0.211*** 1.234***
(0.054) (0.064) (0.081) (0.101)
Number of debts in arrears in t-1 -0.060 0.941 -0.065 0.937
(0.064) (0.060) (0.102) (0.096)
Number of debts in arrears in t-2 0.001 1.001 0.117 1.124
(0.056) (0.056) (0.082) (0.093)
Additional controls Yes Yes
Number of observations 6,295 17,474
Log-likelihood -1189 -1366
(5) Persistent Arrears
Number of formal loans 0.113 1.119 -0.095 0.910
(0.139) (0.156) (0.163) (0.148)
Number of debts in arrears 0.140*** 1.151*** 0.196** 1.217**
(0.052) (0.060) (0.079) (0.096)
Positive arrears in t-1 and t-2 0.012 1.012 0.229 1.258
(0.161) (0.163) (0.257) (0.323)
Additional controls Yes Yes
Number of observations 6,295 17,474
Log-likelihood -1189 -1366
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Additional controls for all regressions are the same
as in Table 2.
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Table 4a: Sensitivity Analysis: Endogeneity - Omitted Variables (I)
Cohabiting Married
Variable Coefficient
Hazard
Ratio Coefficient
Hazard
Ratio
(1) Shocks to Income (between t-1 and t)
Number of debts in arrears 0.117** 1.125** 0.271*** 1.311***
(0.055) (0.062) (0.066) (0.087)
Change in household income between t-1 and t 0.033 1.033 0.018 1.018
(0.036) (0.037) (0.026) (0.026)
Additional controls Yes Yes
Number of observations 6,835 21,822
Log-likelihood -1166 -1737
(2) Shocks to Family Circumstances (between t-1 and t)
Number of debts in arrears 0.113** 1.119** 0.270*** 1.310***
(0.055) (0.061) (0.066) (0.087)
Respondent leaves the labour market 0.114 1.121 0.437 1.548
(0.250) (0.280) (0.285) (0.442)
Partner leaves the labour market -0.026 0.975 -0.219 0.803
(0.326) (0.318) (0.366) (0.294)
Deterioration in respondent's health -0.163 0.850 0.625* 1.868*
(0.462) (0.393) (0.338) (0.631)
Birth of child -0.562** 0.570** -0.489* 0.613*
(0.242) (0.138) (0.287) (0.176)
Additional controls Yes Yes
Number of observations 6,835 21,822
Log-likelihood -1163 -1733
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Additional controls for all regressions
are the same as in Table 2. The survey collects insufficient data on the male partner to capture changes in his
health.
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Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis: Endogeneity - Two-stage Probit
Cohabiting Married
Variable Coefficient Coefficient
Respondent's age at the start of the relationship -0.013** -0.020***
(0.005) (0.006)
Partners have same level of education 0.033 -0.016
(0.058) (0.047)
Respondent 5+ years older than partner -0.013 0.163
(0.132) (0.120)
Respondent between 2 and 5 years older than partner 0.106 0.165*
(0.105) (0.090)
Partner 5+ years older than respondent 0.052 -0.012
(0.065) (0.057)
Child from a previous relationship -0.015 -0.092
(0.077) (0.062)
Previously married 0.014 0.126
(0.121) (0.103)
Number of dependent children -0.040 0.059**
(0.033) (0.025)
=1 if at least 1 child under the age of 4 years in the household -0.074 -0.205***
(0.074) (0.064)
Higher degree/Degree - respondent -0.084 -0.042
(0.109) (0.064)
Higher degree/Degree - partner -0.036 -0.040
(0.107) (0.065)
We share and manage our finances jointly -0.219*** -0.109**
(0.057) (0.044)
Respondent employed -0.049 0.131**
(0.067) (0.057)
Partner employed -0.039 -0.246***
(0.088) (0.078)
Total weekly family earnings (£'00s) 0.000 0.012
(0.013) (0.007)
Owner (=1 if owned outright) -0.224 -0.109
(0.176) (0.108)
Mortgage (=1 if has mortgage against property) -0.176** -0.125*
(0.075) (0.071)
Number of saving accounts -0.037 -0.043**
(0.029) (0.018)
Number of formal loans 0.023 0.009
(0.069) (0.053)
Number of debts in arrears 0.237** 0.269**
(0.101) (0.121)
Constant -0.798*** -0.965***
(0.238) (0.243)
Number of observations 6,835 21,822
Test of overidentifying restrictions (p-value): 0.779 0.537
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions also include
controls for duration of relationship. Instruments for over-indebtedness include: having a prepayment
electricity meter; being unable to afford: two pairs of all-weather shoes for each adult; a celebration with
presents for friends and family at special occasions like birthdays; a one-week holiday away from home,
not staying with relatives; a night out once a month; a car/var.
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Table 6: Symmetry of Shocks
Cohabiting Married Cohabiting Married
Variable Coefficient
Hazard
Ratio Coefficient
Hazard
Ratio Coefficient
Hazard
Ratio Coefficient
Hazard
Ratio
Increase in the number
of savings accounts -0.194 0.824 -0.211 0.810 -0.192 0.826 -0.214 0.808
(0.159) (0.131) (0.143) (0.116) (0.159) (0.131) (0.142) (0.115)
Decrease in the number
of savings accounts 0.076 1.079 0.020 1.020 0.082 1.085 0.031 1.032
(0.147) (0.159) (0.134) (0.137) (0.147) (0.160) (0.134) (0.138)
Takes out a mortgage -0.001 0.999 0.078 1.081 0.007 1.007 0.089 1.093
(0.349) (0.349) (0.383) (0.413) (0.349) (0.351) (0.380) (0.416)
No longer has a
mortgage -1.585 0.205 0.318 1.375 -1.577 0.207 0.310 1.363
(1.008) (0.206) (0.328) (0.451) (1.007) (0.208) (0.327) (0.446)
Increase in the number
of formal loans
outstanding 0.009 1.009 -0.014 0.986 0.015 1.015 -0.018 0.982
(0.195) (0.197) (0.189) (0.186) (0.195) (0.197) (0.188) (0.184)
Decrease in the number
of formal loans
outstanding 0.292* 1.339* 0.224 1.251 0.296* 1.345* 0.226 1.253
(0.161) (0.216) (0.155) (0.194) (0.162) (0.217) (0.154) (0.193)
Increase in the number
of debts in arrears 0.655*** 1.925*** 0.654*** 1.923*** 0.633*** 1.884*** 0.638*** 1.893***
(0.170) (0.328) (0.213) (0.409) (0.171) (0.322) (0.211) (0.399)
Decrease in the number
of debts in arrears 0.535*** 1.707*** -0.117 0.890 0.519*** 1.680*** -0.140 0.869
(0.164) (0.281) (0.251) (0.223) (0.165) (0.277) (0.250) (0.217)
Respondent enters the
labour market 0.260 1.297 -0.053 0.949
(0.228) (0.295) (0.238) (0.226)
Respondent leaves the
labour market 0.039 1.040 0.335 1.398
(0.248) (0.258) (0.279) (0.390)
Partner enters the labour
market 0.191 1.211 0.754** 2.126**
(0.301) (0.365) (0.296) (0.629)
Partner leaves the labour
market -0.069 0.933 -0.335 0.716
(0.327) (0.305) (0.358) (0.256)
Deterioration in
respondent's health -0.152 0.859 0.679** 1.971**
(0.462) (0.396) (0.334) (0.658)
Improvement in
respondent's health -0.154 0.857 0.254 1.289
(0.463) (0.397) (0.395) (0.509)
Number of observations 6,835 21,822 6,835 21,822
Log-likelihood -1166 -1752 -1165 -1746
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Additional controls for all regressions are the same as in Table 2.
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Table 7: Planning for Separation - Changes to Labour Supply (Married Couples)
Variable Coefficient
Hazard
Ratio Coefficient
Hazard
Ratio Coefficient
Hazard
Ratio Coefficient
Hazard
Ratio
Increase in the number of
debts in arrears
0.619*** 1.857*** 0.610*** 1.840*** 0.607*** 1.834*** 0.651** 1.918**
(0.210) (0.389) (0.211) (0.388) (0.209) (0.384) (0.257) (0.493)
Decrease in the number of
debts in arrears
-0.144 0.866 -0.208 0.812 -0.154 0.857 -0.256 0.774
(0.248) (0.215) (0.254) (0.206) (0.248) (0.213) (0.322) (0.250)
Increased hours worked
following active job search
0.792** 2.208** 0.718** 2.049** 0.458 1.580 0.559 1.748
(0.316) (0.699) (0.322) (0.659) (0.362) (0.572) (0.408) (0.713)
Increased hours worked
following active job search *
Number of arrears in debts
in t-1
0.275* 1.317*
(0.158) (0.209)
increased hours worked
following active job search *
Number of outstanding
loans in t-1
0.877** 2.404**
(0.378) (0.910)
Increased hours worked
following active job search *
Partner exits labour market
in t-1
2.402** 11.045**
(1.096) (12.103)
Number of observations 21,822 21,822 21,822 17,095
Log-likelihood -1743 -1742 -1741 -1282
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Additional controls for all regressions are the same as in Table 6. We only
have information on partner’s employment for the duration of the partnership, which is why the number of observations is smaller for the regression
in column 3.
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Table 8: Relationship Strain and Separation
Cohabiting Married
Variable Coefficient
Hazard
Ratio Coefficient
Hazard
Ratio
(1) Active job search
Increase in the number of debts in arrears 0.627*** 1.872*** 0.554*** 1.739***
(0.167) (0.313) (0.208) (0.362)
Decrease in the number of debts in arrears 0.518*** 1.678*** -0.172 0.842
(0.161) (0.271) (0.248) (0.209)
Lived apart from partner/spouse in last 12 months 1.730*** 5.639*** 2.157*** 8.643***
(0.286) (1.615) (0.454) (3.920)
Increased hours worked following active job search -0.411 0.663 0.812*** 2.253***
(0.333) (0.221) (0.257) (0.579)
Lived part from partner/spouse in last 12
months*Increased households worked following active
job search
-0.424 0.654 -0.019 0.981
(1.108) (0.725) (1.132) (1.111)
Additional controls Yes Yes
Number of observations 6,835 21,822
Log-likelihood -1149 -1730
(2) Number of debts in arrears
Increase in the number of debts in arrears 0.639*** 1.895*** 0.631*** 1.879***
(0.168) (0.317) (0.211) (0.396)
Decrease in the number of debts in arrears 0.511*** 1.667*** -0.156 0.855
(0.162) (0.269) (0.250) (0.214)
Lived apart from partner/spouse in last 12 months 1.949***† 7.021*** 2.543***† 12.721***
(0.343) (2.405) (0.470) (5.983)
Lived apart from partner/spouse in last 12
months*Number of debts in arrears
-0.237† 0.789 -0.300† 0.741
(0.215) (0.169) (0.221) (0.164)
Additional controls Yes Yes
Number of observations 6,835 21,822
Log-likelihood -1149 -1734
(3) Number of formal loans
Increase in the number of debts in arrears 0.615*** 1.849*** 0.596*** 1.814***
(0.167) (0.309) (0.210) (0.381)
Decrease in the number of debts in arrears 0.503*** 1.654*** -0.157 0.855
(0.161) (0.267) (0.250) (0.214)
Lived apart from partner/spouse in last 12 months 1.987*** 7.296*** 2.425***† 11.305***
(0.310) (2.263) (0.451) (5.098)
Lived part from partner/spouse in last 12
months*Number of formal loans -1.145* 0.318* -1.200† 0.301
(0.693) (0.221) (1.056) (0.318)
Additional controls Yes Yes
Number of observations 6,835 21,822
Log-likelihood -1149 -1734
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Additional controls for all regressions are the same as in
Table 6; † jointly significant at the 5% level
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Appendices
Appendix 1
Table 1A: Summary Statistics: Household and Partnership Characteristics
Variable Cohabit Separate – Cohabit Married Separate - Married
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Length of relationship (years) 5.73 5.2 3.94 4.08 14.7 7.49 11.68 6.57
Difference in age (Respondent's
age - partner's age) -2.51 5.89 -2.92 6.12 -2.38 4.49 -2.23 5.15
Partners have same level of
education 0.34 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.31 0.46
Child from a previous
relationship 0.34 0.47 0.25 0.43 0.83 0.38 0.66 0.48
Previously married 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23 0.03 0.18 0.06 0.24
Household characteristics: 34.35 7.8 30.76 7.71 39.55 7.26 36.45 6.89
Respondent’s age (years) 36.85 8.55 33.68 8.55 41.93 7.86 38.68 7.51
Partner’s age (years) 1.74 0.9 1.88 1.04 1.72 0.92 2.01 0.94
Number of dependent children 0.56 0.5 0.67 0.47 0.38 0.49 0.43 0.5
=1 if at least 1 child under the
age of 4 years in the household 0.15 0.36 0.07 0.26 0.25 0.43 0.15 0.35
Higher degree/Degree –
respondent 0.13 0.33 0.06 0.24 0.25 0.43 0.14 0.35
Higher degree/Degree – partner 0.5 0.5 0.38 0.49 0.52 0.5 0.46 0.5
Number of observations
(person-year) 8,057 1,066 24,303 1,077
43
Appendix 2
Table 2A: Symmetry of Shocks
Cohabiting Married
Variable Coefficient
Hazard
Ratio Coefficient
Hazard
Ratio
Increase in the number of formal loans outstanding 0.015 1.015 -0.016 0.985
(0.195) (0.198) (0.187) (0.184)
Decrease in the number of formal loans outstanding 0.295* 1.342* 0.228 1.256
(0.162) (0.217) (0.154) (0.193)
Increase in the number of debts in arrears 0.634*** 1.886*** 0.637*** 1.891***
(0.171) (0.322) (0.210) (0.397)
Decrease in the number of debts in arrears 0.518*** 1.678*** -0.141 0.868
(0.165) (0.277) (0.249) (0.216)
Respondent enters the labour market 0.258 1.294 -0.047 0.954
(0.228) (0.295) (0.237) (0.226)
Respondent leaves the labour market 0.035 1.036 0.344 1.411
(0.248) (0.257) (0.279) (0.393)
Partner enters employment from unemployment 0.053 1.055 0.809* 2.246*
(0.403) (0.425) (0.413) (0.928)
Partner enters employment from out of the labour
force
0.379 1.461 0.711* 2.035*
(0.435) (0.635) (0.404) (0.823)
Partner leaves the labour market -0.064 0.938 -0.340 0.712
(0.327) (0.306) (0.357) (0.254)
Constant -1.119** 0.326** -2.525*** 0.080***
(0.483) (0.158) (0.889) (0.071)
Number of observations 6,835 21,822
Log-likelihood -1165 -1747
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Additional controls for all regressions are the
same as in Table 2.
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Appendix 3: Determinants of Job Search
As mentioned, the FACS asks our female respondents a series of questions on job search
including whether they have been looking for paid work of 16 hours or more a week at any
time during the past 12 months (Table 7). We use the responses to this question to estimate
the determinants of job search for our married female respondents ( ity =1) using a latent
variable model of the form:
ݕ௜௧
∗ = ݖ௜௧ᇱߜ+ ߙ௜+ ߝ௜௧
where ݕ௜௧∗ is a continuous but unobserved propensity for job search, ݖ௜௧ is a vector of
explanatory variables, i captures time invariant individual specific effects, and the error
term, ߝ௜௧ is assumed to have a logistic distribution. Chamberlain (1980, 1984) shows that such
a fixed-effects logit model can be estimated by conditional maximum likelihood.
Table 3A illustrates the results for the fixed effect (conditional) logistic model for the
probability of job search. The results show that the female respondent’s decision to increase
her labour supply appears to be strongly linked to a worsening financial situation in the home.
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Table 3A: Conditional (Fixed Effects) Logit for the Determinants of Job Search
Variable Coefficient
We share and manage our finances jointly 1.019
(0.077)
Partner unemployed 1.742**
(0.380)
Owner (=1 if owned outright) 0.802
(0.225)
Mortgage (=1 if has mortgage against property) 0.817
(0.178)
Saving (=1 if savings) 1.025
(0.089)
Loan (=1 if has a loan, 0 otherwise) 1.072
(0.074)
Number of debts in arrears 1.121*
(0.066)
Number of observations 7,243
Log-likelihood -2653
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We find that her search decision is partly linked to the male partner’s employment status.
In households where the partner becomes unemployed the female respondent is more likely
to start to search for employment. Similarly, increased financial stress brought about by an
increase in the number of debts the household cannot repay is also likely to trigger female job
search. In contrast, variables that might depict deterioration in the stability of the partnership,
such as changes to the system of money management are insignificant in this setting.
